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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
FIRST EQUITY CORPORATION, a Florida 
corporation, 
Appellant, 
vs. 
UTAH STATE UNIVERSITY, a body politic 
and corporate, and DONALD A. CATRON, 
an individual, 
Respondents. 
CASE NO. 13798 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a damage action brought by a registered securities 
broker, First Equity Corporation ("First Equity"), a Florida 
corporation, against Donald A. Catron ("Catron"), formerly the 
Assistant Vice President of Finance of Utah State University, and 
against Utah State University ("USU"), seeking recovery of commis-
sions and other monies lost by First Equity as a direct conse-
quence of USU's refusal to accept certain shares ordered by Catron 
at a time when he was Assistant Vice President of Finance. 
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
After substantial pleading, amendments to pleadings, and dis-
covery, First Equity and USU filed opposing motions for summary 
judgment which were argued before the Lower Court. The Court 
granted summary judgment in favor of USU and denied summary 
judgment in favor of First Equity. Catron1s defenses and counter-
claims were not involved in the opposing motions below, nor are 
they involved in this appeal. * 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks reversal of the summary judgment of the 
Lower Court and judgment in its favor against USU. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. USU AUTHORIZED CATRON TO PURCHASE SECURITIES OF ANY 
KIND THROUGH ANY BROKER WHO WAS A MEMBER OF ANY MAJOR SECURITIES 
EXCHANGE OR THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS. 
USU is a corporate body politic whose rights and powers are 
perpetuated by the Constitution of the State of Utah. (Record 
[hereinafter cited as "R."] at 203). Catron was employed by USU 
on March 16, 1970, as a consultant to the retiring Controller. 
(R. 29, 194, 200; Deposition of Catron [hereinafter cited as 
"D."]f at 9). From July 1, 1970 until approximately January, 1972, 
Catron served as Controller of USU. (R. 194-196, 212; D. 9-10). 
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While he was thus serving, the USU Institutional Council, a 
council organized pursuant to 5B Utah Code Annotated §53-48-19 
(1953) (hereinafter cited as "U.C.A."), adopted a formal invest-
ment policy establishing an Investment Committee and providing 
for the appointment of Catron as "the University money manager 
with authority to make investment decisions in keeping with 
established policies and submit reports of performance and 
portfolio investments at least monthly to the Investment Commit-
tee and quarterly to the Institutional Council.ff (R. 309, 314-16). 
This policy was adopted on June 26, 1971, and represented only 
one of five different resolutions containing similar authorizations 
for Catron to invest the funds of USU. (R. 151). On January 20, 
1972, the Institutional Council approved a corporate resolution 
authorizing Dee A. Broadbent, ("Broadbent"), Vice President for 
Business and Treasurer of USU, or Catron to act for USU in open-
ing and maintaining: 
. . . an account with any broker who is a 
member of any of the major security exchanges 
or the National Association of Security [sic] 
Dealers for the purchase§ trade, and sale, 
long or short, transfer, and assign [sic], 
stocks, bonds, and securities of every nature 
on margin or otherwise, and that any of the 
officers hereinafter named be, and hereby is 
authorized to give written or verbal instruc-
tion to the brokers concerning the herein 
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named transactions; and he shall at all 
times have authority in every way to bind 
and obligate this corporation for the carry-
ing out of any contract or transaction which 
shall, for or on behalf of this corporation, 
be entered into or made with or through the 
brokers; and that the brokers are authorized , 
to receive from this corporation, checks and 
drafts drawn upon the funds of this corpora- , t 
tion by any officer or employee of this corpo-
ration, and to apply the same to the credit 
of this corporation or to its account with 
said brokers: All confirmations, notices, 
and demands upon this corporation may be de-
livered by the brokers verbally or in writing, 
or by telegraph, or by telephone to any such 
officer and he is authorized to empower any 
person, or persons, that he deems proper, at 
any time, or times, to do any and all things 
that he is hereinbefore authorized to do. 
That this resolution shall be and remain in 
full force and effect until written notice 
of the revocation hereof shall be delivered 
to the brokers. [Emphasis added]. 
(R. 106, 137-38, 161-62). . 
2. PURSUANT TO HIS AUTHORITY, CATRON OPENED A SPECIAL 
CASH ACCOUNT WITH FIRST EQUITY, A MEMBER OF THE NATIONAL 
ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS, AND THROUGH THAT ACCOUNT, 
CATRON ORDERED AND USU RECEIVED, ACCEPTED, AND PAID FOR CERTAIN 
SECURITIES. 
During the Winter of 1971-72 and while acting in his capacity 
as "University money manager11, Catron attended a Florida invest-
ment seminar sponsored by First Equity, a securities broker re-
gistered with the National Association of Securities Dealers. 
(R. 412; D. 21-23, 78-79). Catron attended a similar seminar 
sponsored by First Equity in approximately September,. 1972. 
.4. 
(D. 79-80, 93-95). At these seminars, Catron met the officers 
and agents of First Equity and was identified to them as the 
"investment officer11 at USU. His expenses were paid by USU. 
(D. 22-23, 78-80). Shortly after the second seminar, Catron 
began purchasing shares on behalf of USU through a special cash 
account with First Equity. (R. 275, 298, 303; D. 93). 
Although evidence with respect to the opening of the account 
with First Equity is inconclusive as to the procedure followed 
in that instance, the decision to open such an account was 
generally transmitted by telephone to the broker. (D. 81). 
Catron presumed that his secretary or one of the part-time girls 
would send authorizing resolutions to all of the brokerage firms 
because that was standard procedure. (D. 74-77, 82-84). Although 
Marcia Ann Beazer, Catronfs secretary, did not think that it was 
"standard procedure11 to send out a copy of the January 20, 1972 
corporate resolution to every broker, she conceded that it was 
"possible" that she had sent a copy of the resolution to First 
Equity. (R. 321). In any case, Catron indicated that he dis-
cussed his authority over the telephone with the broker and he 
considered it a "mechanical" matter to send the form. (D. 74-75). 
Between October 27, 1972, and February 28, 1973, Catron 
ordered by telephone the purchase of the following corporate 
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securities through First Equity: 
Trade 
Date 
10-27-72 
12-22-72 
1-8-73 
1-9-73 
1-12-73 
*l-17-73 
1-23-73 
1-23-73 
1-23-75 
*l-31-73 
1-31-73 
1-31-73 
1-31-73 
*2-28-73 
*2-28-73 
*2-28-73 
2-28-73 
Company 
Name 
.Cunningham Arts 
Hughes Tool Co. 
Fashion Fabrics 
Fashion Fabrics 
1
 X -
Fashion Fabrics 
Number of 
Shares 
11,000 
2,000 
3,100 
1,900 
5,000 
Advanced Memory Systems 5,000 
A.T. & T. Co. 
Ford Motor Co. 
Taft Broadcasting Co. 
Panelrama 
Levitz Furniture Corp 
National General 
Health Industries 
2,000 
2,000 
2,000 
24,100 
. 9,000 
5,000 
15,000 
Great Basins Petroleum 83,000 
Computing & Softwares 
Natomas Co. 
Fashion Fabrics 
55,700 
13,000 
51,600 
Price 
$129,437.50 
82.937.50 
46,350.00 
28,925.00 
69,925.00 
111,250.00 
105,000.00 
148,750.00 
95,787.50 
289,200.00 
192,375.00 
166,250.00 
58,125.00 
251,400.00 
563,962.50 
728,000.00 
445,050.00 
Broker's 
Commission 
$1,119.75 
471.51 
351.55 
641.70 
807.00 
662.00 
837.00 
621.15 
2,282.80 
1,291.50 
1,027.00 
994.50 
4,519.60 
3,654.05 
2,677.70 
3,423.15 
(R. 99-149, 160-62; D. 80-81). First Equity delivered certificates 
for all of the shares listed above, except for those orders marked 
by an asterisk, and USU received, accepted, and paid for them in 
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full, including applicable commissions. (R. 1-20, 99-149, 160-62, 
164). 
3. CATRON ORDERED SECURITIES THROUGH FIRST EQUITY, A FLORIDA 
BROKER, BECAUSE ITS DELIVERY TIME WAS SLOWER THAN OTHER BROKERS AND, 
THEREFORE, USU WAS ABLE TO KEEP AND USE ITS FUNDS FOR A LONGER 
PERIOD OF TIME. 
On October 27, 1972, Catron placed an order with First Equity 
to purchase 11,000 shares of Cunningham Arts on behalf of USU and 
he instructed First Equity to make delivery against payment at 
the First Security Bank in Logan, Utah. (R. 99-149, 160-62, 312-13). 
First Equity purchased the shares on behalf of USU and caused cer-
tificates to be delivered to First Security Bank. A representa-
tive of the bank informed USU that the certificates had arrived 
and delivered them to USU upon receipt of a check for the price 
of the stock made payable to the bank. (R. 312-13). Payment for 
all of the 11,000 shares was not completed by USU until December 
5, 1972, approximately thirty-nine days after the order was placed. 
(R. 303). 
When Catron became acquainted with the delays which were in-
volved in obtaining delivery from and making payment to First 
Equity, he increased his use of the brokerage firm. He considered 
the longer time periods a distinct advantage to USU because the 
university could keep and use its funds for a longer period of 
time.
 d(D. 118-19, 218-21). 
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4. ON MARCH 19, 1973, USU REFUSED TO ACCEPT DELIVERY OF 
CERTAIN SECURITIES, WHICH HAD BEEN ORDERED BY CATRON ON BEHALF 
OF USU, ON THE GROUNDS THAT CATRON HAD NO AUTHORITY TO ORDER THEM. 
Five of USU's orders, each of which is marked on the above 
list by an asterisk, were not accepted by USU. On March 13, 1973, 
First Equity tendered delivery to USU of 3,000 shares of Ad-
vanced Memory Systems, but USU refused payment. (R. 305, 307, 
313). At approximately the same time, delivery was tendered to 
USU of sufficient shares to satisfy the other four outstanding 
orders. (R. 313, 342). On March 19, 1973, First Equity was in-
formed by USU that the university would not accept delivery with 
respect to all five orders on the grounds that Catron was not 
authorized to purchase securities on behalf of USU. (R. 196, 251). 
Written confirmation of this was given to First Equity's Salt 
Lake City attorney on March 22, 1973, by hand delivered letter 
from Assistant Attorney General Mark A. Madsen ("Madsen11). (R. 
330-31). 
5. NOTICE OF A SECRET TERMINATION OF CATRONfS AUTHORITY 
TO PURCHASE SECURITIES ON BEHALF OF USU WAS NOT GIVEN TO FIRST 
EQUITY UNTIL AFTER FEBRUARY 28, 1973. 
Catron was appointed "University money manager11 by the USU 
Institutional Council on or about June 26, 1971, and he continued 
to carry out the duties of that position until March 20, 1973, 
when he was officially suspended* (R. 196, 212-13). 
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As the investment officer of USU, Catron was invested with 
"authority to make investment decisions in keeping with establish-
ed policies11. (R. 309, 314-16). The policy statement adopted by 
the Institutional Council at the time Catron was appointed gave 
him authority for the following three years (until June 26, 1974) 
to "reinvest11 up to sixty percent (60%) of the funds that were 
not needed for current purposes "to build up the investment pool 
for long range objectives." (R. 315-16). 
Approximately six months later, the Institutional Council 
further authorized Catron and Broadbent, Catronfs immediate su-
perior, to establish accounts with registered brokers for the 
purchase of "stocks, bonds, and securities of every nature on 
margin or otherwise". The authorization was to "remain in full 
force and effect until written notice [of a revocation was] deliv-
ered to the brokers." (R. 106, 137-58, 161-62). 
First Equity received no notice of revocation until so 
informed by telephone on March 19, 1973, and received no written 
notice of revocation until March 22, 1973. (R. 196, 251, 330-31). 
Thus, Catron1s investment duties and authority were officially 
suspended and notice of the revocation of his authority was given 
to First Equity some three weeks after February 28, 1973. 
USU claims that Catron's authority to purchase common stock 
was revoked beginning around December 4, 1972. (R. 152, 203, 359). 
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Whether or not this is true has no bearing on this appeal. USU 
continued to receive, accept, pay for, and enjoy the benefits of 
owning common stock ordered by Catron on behalf of USU until after 
February 28, 1973. Every order placed with First Equity, other 
than the first one, was communicated to First Equity on or after 
December 22, 1972. (R. 99-149, 160-62, 164). As shown by the 
• * • • . • . • ' ' • ~ v - * 
list of orders set forth hereinabove, USU received, accepted and 
paid for $1,356,537.50 in common stock after the alleged secret 
revocation. Indeed, the February 28, 1973 order for 51,600 
shares of Fashion Fabrics was received, accepted, and paid for 
in full in the amount of $445,050.00 plus brokerfs commissions 
in early March, 1973, approximately three months after the al-
leged secret revocation. (R. 99-149, 160-62). 
6. FIRST EQUITY SUFFERED MONETARY DAMAGES AS A RESULT OF 
USU'S REFUSAL TO ACCEPT DELIVERY OF CERTAIN SECURITIES. 
After USUfs refusal to accept delivery of the orders marked 
by asterisks in the above list, First Equity and others effected 
a cancellation of the transactions involved with respect to 
these orders, except that of Advanced Memory Systems shares. 
(R. 329, 350-51). As a result of USUfs refusal to accept delivery 
of all five orders, First Equity lost brokerage commissions in 
the amount of $13,941.15. (R. 425). As a result of USU's refusal 
* 
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to accept delivery of Advanced Memory Systems shares, First 
Equity suffered losses on the sale of those shares in the amount 
of $37,045.27. (R. 248-49). 
Upon USUfs refusal to pay for the losses incurred by First 
Equity as a result of USUfs refusal to accept the shares, First 
Equity filed a Complaint in the District Court of Cache County, 
Utah, naming USU and Catron as the parties responsible for the 
losses and seeking recovery of damages. (R. 1-20). Cross Motions 
for Summary Judgment were made by USU and First Equity based upon 
the allegations in the Complaint. (R. 238-39, 433-34). No motion 
was filed by Catron. 
Summary Judgment in favor of the university was granted on 
the ground the 4A U.C.A. §33-1-1 prohibited USU from investing 
any funds in common stock and, therefore, First Equityfs Complaint 
failed to state a claim for relief which could be granted. (R. 435D). 
First Equityfs Motion for Summary Judgment was denied on the 
grounds that (1) USU had no statutory power to invest public funds 
in common stock, (2) a triable issue of fact existed as to whether 
non-public funds were available to purchase the common stock, and 
(3) Regulation T, promulgated by the Federal Reserve Board under 
the authority of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, constituted 
a complete defense as to liability for damages arising out of 
orders which had not been delivered within thirty-five days of 
the trade date. (R. 435B). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING FIRST EQUITY'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT AND IN GRANTING USU'S CROSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
BECAUSE USU HAD POWER TO INVEST FUNDS IN ITS POSSESSION IN SEC-
URITIES OTHER THAN THOSE ENUMERATED IN SECTION 33-1-1, UTAH 
CODE ANNOTATED (1953). 
A. Reason for Appeal. " "'' J 
The Court below granted USU's Cross-Motion on the ground 
that First Equity's claim was "barred by the provisions of the 
Utah Code prohibiting the investment by state employees of funds 
in their custody in securities other than those enumerated in 
Utah Code §33-1-1." (R. 435D). The Order of the Lower Court is , 
in error because USU had the power to invest in common stock as 
part of its general power to control and supervise all appropri-
ated and donated funds; to purchase, hold and sell all forms of 
personal property; to invest and manage such property; and to 
handle its own financial affairs. 
, . . . , • • - . . , . . - • ' • • < / . ( v . . . . . . ... ... .,. -
'•'••-•' •'" "
 c ;
 •• '•' ' -"-'C ! ' \ ; . ... ••• :., ;'.. t ' . / , • • . „ i • \ \ \ ' ; ; ; • ; . . - " ' . • \ i ' ' .• 
B. Statutory Authority to Invest0 
In 1888, an Agricultural College and an Experiment Station 
were created by the Territorial Legislature, and a governing 
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Board of Trustees was established with the following duties and 
powers: 
They shall have the general control and super-
vision of the agricultural college, the farm 
pertaining thereto, and such land as may be 
vested in the college by Territorial legisla-
o tion, of all appropriations made by the Ter-
ritory for the support of the same, and also 
of lands that may hereafter be donated by the 
Territory . . . or by any person or corporation, 
in trust for the promotion of agricultural and 
industrial pursuits . . . . [Emphasis added]. 
COMPILED LAWS OF UTAH §1855(1888). 
The authority so granted to generally control and supervise all 
appropriations and private donations was clearly intended to 
invest the College with broad discretion in handling its finan-
cial affairs. This general authority to control and supervise 
lands and appropriations was perpetuated in 1895 by Article X, 
Section 4 of the Utah Constitution, which provides: 
The location and establishment by existing 
laws of the University of Utah, and the 
Agricultural College are hereby confirmed, 
and all the rights, immunities, franchises, 
and endowments heretofore granted or conferred, 
are hereby perpetuated unto said University 
and Agricultural College respectively. 
The structure of USU was revised in 1929 by the Utah 
Legislature, changing its status to that of a ffbody politic 
and corporate11, but the Legislature expressly perpetuated in 
the College "all rights, immunities, franchises and endowments" 
-13-
theretofore "granted or conferred11. The statute further pro-
vided that USU: 
. . . may have and use a corporate seal, may 
sue and be sued and contract and be contracted 
with. It may take, hold, lease, sell and convey 
real and personal property as the interests of 
the college may require. [Emphasis added]. 
5B U.C.A. §53-32-2. 
The language here is extremely broad, with no indication that 
the "property11 which may be taken, held, sold and conveyed is 
exclusive of common stock. Section 53-32-4 of the same Act 
delineated the general "corporate powers of USU with respect to 
the use of funds received by gift, grant, devise or bequest: 
The Utah State Agricultural College [Utah 
State University of Agriculture and Applied 
Science] in its corporate capacity may take 
by purchase, grant, gift, devise or bequest 
any property real or personal for the use of 
any department of the college and for any pur-
pose appropriate to the objects of the college. 
It may convert property received by gift, grant, 
devise or bequest and not suitable for its uses 
into other property so available or into money. 
Such property so received or converted shall 
be held, invested and managed, and the pro-
ceeds thereof used by the board of trustees 
for the purposes and under the conditions pre-
scribed in the grant or donation . . . . 
[Emphasis added]. 
5B U.C..A. §53-32-4. 
In 1969, the Legislature reiterated the universityfs general 
power to control and manage its finances in the Higher Education 
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Act, 5B U.C.A. §53-48-1. et se£0 That Act did not limit or 
narrow the universityfs existing general powers, but rather 
indicated a broad discretion in the management of all funds; 
Each university and college and the Utah 
Technical College at Provo and the Utah 
Technical College at Salt Lake City may 
do its own purchasing, issue its own pay-
rolls, and handle its own financial affairs 
under the general supervision of the Board 
as provided in this act. [Emphasis added] . 
5B U.C.A. §53-48-10(5). 
In addition, the 1969 Act specifies that: 
Any institution, college or department or 
its foundation or organization engaged in 
a program authorized by the board [of Higher ... 
Education] may: 
(c) Accept contributions, grants or 
gifts from any private organization. . .». 
(d) Retain, accumulate, invest» commit 
and expend the funds and proceeds of such 
authorized programs . . . . [Emphasis added]. 
5B U.C.A. §53-48-20(3). 
The power to invest was expressly and explicitly granted with 
respect to non-appropriated funds such as private contributions, 
grants or gifts. In addition, USU was expressly and explicitly 
empowered to take any form of personal property by purchase, to 
hold, and to sell that property as the interests of the college 
may require. These explicit powers and the other broad powers of 
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USU to manage, control, and supervise its financial affairs 
were established and perpetuated by early statutes and the Utah 
Constitution. They were recognized and continued by the 1969 
Act, and were not abrogated until after the relevant events involved 
in this case were completed. See The State Money Management 
Act of 1974, U.C.A. §51-7-1 et seq.(1974 Interim Supplement). 
C. Investment Activities of USU. 
This Court has stated that legitimate sources of enlighten-
ment as to legislative intent are the actions of those entities 
which have the responsibility of conforming to the statutory 
provision in question. State Board of Education v. State Board 
of Higher Education, 29 Utah 2d 110, 505 P.2d 1113 (1973). It 
is certainly true that USU and other Utah universities have had 
a long history of investing in common stock, which practice con-
tinued unchallenged until the events which precipitated this liti-
gation. The governing bodies and officers of the university 
construed the existing statutory pattern as one permitting USU to 
invest in common stock0 Indeed, it appears from the record that 
no question as to the propriety, let alone the legality, of com-
mon stock purchases arose until the University Investment Program 
began to show a substantial loss. (R. 212, 214). Even at the time 
questions were raised by the university and its accountants, an 
opinion from the Attorney Generalfs office indicated that USU 
was empowered, at least, to invest "funds derived from grants, 
gifts, devises or bequests in such securities or other property 
as it deems fit or as the donor may specify.11 (R. 157, at 5). 
D. The Proper Interpretation of Section 33-1-1. 
USU argued below that the explicit Legislative grants of 
power to purchase, hold and sell all forms of personal property, 
to convert private donations into other forms of property, and 
to invest such property, were insufficient to give USU the power 
to invest in common stock. (R# 366-68). By implication, USU 
argued and the Lower Court ruled that any actions relating to 
investment in common stock, carried out by the governing bodies 
and officers of the university after the enactment of Section 
33-1-1 of the Utah Code in 1939, were all ultra vires. 
It is only upon such an erroneous interpretation of existing 
statutory and constitutional language that USU is able to construct 
-its primary theory that Section 33-1-1 is an enabling statute 
without which no power exists to invest any funds whatsoever in 
any form of securities. That is, until 1939, when the statute was 
passed, none of the persons or organizations listed in the statute 
could legally invest in any form of securities. USU1s secondary 
theory appears to be that Section 33-1-1 is a prohibitory statute 
which restricts previously held powers of investment to the power 
to invest only in the securities listed in Section 33-1-1. The 
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Court below appears to have adopted this latter theory. (R. 435D). 
Because the proper interpretation of this statute is so 
significant to this appeal, it is set forth in its entirety: 
Investments in certain securities declared 
lawful. On and after the passage of this 
act investment by receivers, insurance com-
panies of whatever type or nature, building 
and loan associations, savings and loan 
associations and other financial institu-
tions, charitable, educational, eleemosynary > 
and public corporations and organizations, 
1 ._ municipalities and other public corporations 
and bodies, mutual assessment insurance com-
panies, mutual benevolent and benefit associ-
ations; or investment of funds of any state 
insurance fund, state sinking fund, state bs.vv 
school fund, firemen's relief and pension 
fund, police pension fund, or other pension . 
fund; or investment by any administrative 
department, board, commission or officer of r ? iri 
the state government, and of any county 
government, authorized by law to make invest- J £ 
ments of funds in the custody or under the 
control of such department, board, commission, r 
or officer, school district or township, or. 
the investment by any private, political, or 
public instrumentality, body, corporation or 
,-.-.:: person of their own funds or funds in their - -^^-
possession in bonds and other obligations of 
or bonds or obligations guaranteed as to 
interest and principal by the United States; 
bonds or debentures issued by any federal n, 
home loan bank in accordance with the pro-
visions of the Federal Home Loan Bank Act i
 ? ^ 
as now or hereafter amended; consolidated 
,r federal home loan bank bonds or debentures 
issued by the Federal Home Loan Bank Board 
in accordance with the provisions of the 
Federal Home Loan Bank Act as now or hereafter 
amended; farm loan bonds, consolidated farm 
loan bonds, debentures, consolidated deben-
. -18-
tures and other obligations issued by fed- „/ . .-. 
eral land banks and federal intermediate 
credit banks under the authority of the 
Federal Farm Loan Act approved July 17, 1916, 
as now or hereafter amended (Title 12, U.S.C. 
Sections 636-1012 and sections 1021-1129), 
and the bonds, debentures, consolidated 
debentures and other obligations issued by 
banks for co-operatives under the authority 
of the Farm Credit Act of 1933, as now or 
hereafter amended (Title 12 U.S.C., Sections 
1131-1138f); bonds or debentures issued by 
^
 r the federal savings and loan insurance cor-
poration in accordance with the provisions 
of Title IV of the National Housing Act as 
now or hereafter amended; in shares or ac-
counts of building and loan associations i 
which have been insured by the federal sav-
ings and loan insurance corporation and 
shares or accounts of federal savings and 
loan associations incorporated under* the '"' 
provisions of the Home Owners1 Loan Act of 
1933 as now or hereafter amended; which have 
been insured by the federal savings and loan 
insurance corporation to the extent to which 
the withdrawal or repurchasable value of 
such shares or accounts now are or may here- _ 
after be insured by the federal savings 
and loan insurance corporation under the Acts .„,, 
of Congress of the United States of America 
now in effect or which may hereafter be en- :;v 
acted, shall be lawful0 [Emphasis added] . 
4A U.C.A. §33-1-1. 
The following significant points about this section must 
be emphasized. First, the statute consists of one declaratory 
sentence, the basic structure of which is as follows: "[Invest-
ment by [named parties] of their own funds or funds in their 
possession in [specified securities] shall be lawful.11 USUfs 
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interpretation of the statute is the negative implication of 
this declaration, to wit: "investment by the named parties of 
their own funds or funds in their possession in other than spec-
ified securities shall be unlawful," 
Second, the statute expressly refers to f,any private, politi-
cal or public . . . corporation or person" and its provisions 
and meaning must be equally applied to private corporations and 
person. If it is to be construed as USU contended below, and as 
the Lower Court held, such persons would be prohibited thereby 
from investment of their funds in any but the enumerated securities. 
That such was the legislative intent of Section 33-1-1 is manifestly 
absurd.
 t . * ' ' 
Third, if Section 33-1-1 is to be regarded as an enabling 
statute, constituting the source of investment authority available 
to the university and other persons subject to its provisions, 
what is to be made of the express direction of the Legislature ten 
years earlier that USUfs property "shall be held, invested and 
managed, and the proceeds thereof used by the board of trustees 
for the purposes and under the conditions prescribed"? See 
5B U.C.A. §53-32-4. USUfs theory makes the 1929 legislative 
mandate mere surplusage. 
Fourth, the statute itself refers to "investment by any . . . 
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board . . . or officer of the state government, authorized by 
law to make investments of funds in the custody or under the < 
control of such . . . board . . • or officer . . . .,f This 
wording contemplates other authorizing or enabling laws and regu-
lations; it does not authorize USUfs board of trustees to make 
investments through legally appointed officers, it merely recog-
nizes that certain state boards and officers have such authority. 
Section 33-1-1 does not create new powers. 
Fifth, it must be considered whether Section 33-1-1 is a 
prohibitory statute, one which limits previously authorized 
investment powers. The Lower Court adopted this interpretation. 
(R. 435D). Such an interpretation is, of course, based upon the 
premise that such powers have been previously granted. The statute 
is noticeably free from specific prohibitive language such as 
would be necessary to terminate previously existing powers. 
Furthermore, the prohibition would have to apply to. private persons 
and corporations as well as to USU and it is clear that investments 
by private persons in securities other than those listed in Section 
33-1-1 have not been prohibited or declared unlawful by the Utah 
Legislature. To argue that Section 33-1-1 is a prohibitory statute 
is, again, manifestly absurd. 
. The proper interpretation of Section 33-1-1 is very simple. 
Without prohibiting any other investments or requiring only the 
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listed investments, the Legislature declared that certain invest-
ments were lawful. As Section 33-1-3 states, "The provisions of 
this act [including Section 33-1-1] are supplemental to any and 
all other laws relating to and declaring what shall be legal in-
vestments . . . .fl Lists of legal investments "tend to give help 
to trustees in selecting investments and work in the direction 
of certainty as to investment duties". G. BOGURT, HANDBOOK OF THE 
LAW OF TRUSTS 420 (3d ed. 1952). A trustee, such as a "University 
money manager" administering the monies placed in his custody, who 
buys securities on the legal list will "in all probability be ^ 
protected against any claim of breach of trust; but following the 
legal list does not absolutely insure protection to the trustee 
against liability." J|d. A trustee must always use reasonable 
care in following a list of legal investments. Id., at 421. rr 
E. Proper Governance of State Investments. : 
The major argument raised by USU against this straight-forward— 
interpretation of Section 33-1-1 is that it leads to a situation 
in which funds in the university1s custody could be invested in 
"anything", including speculative securities. That argument, of 
course, ignores the strict duties and obligations imposed upon 
public officers by the common law. See generally 63 Am Jur 2d, 
Public Officers and Employees, §§ 328-29. Nevertheless, it must 
be acknowledged that the concern is legitimate in light of the 
-99-
broad investment powers, as to both appropriated and non-
appropriated funds, which were possessed by the university. 
In State of Utah v. duPont Walston, Inc., [Current Binder] 
CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. H94,812 (D. Utah, October 1, 1974), Judge 
Anderson commented on this very problem: 
The court has serious concerns with plaintiffs1 
theory that the University does not have power 
to invest in common stocks for it does not ap-
pear that the Utah Code Ann. §33-1-1 (1966) is 
an enabling statute which clearly sets forth 
the investment guidelines for state universi-
ties. The court is equally concerned with . . . 
the theory that would give state universities 
a free hand in all investment matters. 
Id., at 96,716. 
An identical concern on the part of the Utah Legislature 
is evidenced by its passage of the State Money Management Act 
of 1974, U.C.A. §51-7-1 et se£. (1974 Interim Supplement), 
which for the very first time establishes legislative limits to 
the universityfs discretion. Several of that Act's provisions 
make it clear that Section 33-1-1 is not to be construed as USU 
argued below. The Actfs purposes were set forth as follows: 
Purpose of act. (1) The purpose of 
this act is to secure the maximum public 
benefit from the deposit and investment 
of public funds, and, in furtherance of 
such purpose: 
(a) To safeguard and protect deposits 
of public funds by providing qualifications 
for depositories of these funds; 
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(b) To establish and maintain a 
continuing statewide policy for the 
deposit and investment of public funds; 
(c) To establish a system of cen-
tralized investment for state money and 
- to authorize public treasurers to invest 
public funds either under the state policy 
or through centralized state management 
of pooled investment funds; and 
(d) To establish minimum require-
ments for bonding of public treasurers. 
(2) The legislature finds that the 
objectives of this act will best be ob-
tained through improved money management, 
emphasizing the primary requirements of 
safety and liquidity and recognizing the 
different investment objectives of oper-
ating and permanent funds and the impor-
tance of investing public funds within 
the state so as to promote the economic 
welfare of the entire state. 
If, as was argued below, the Legislature had enacted a continuing 
statewide investment policy through Section 33-1-1, the Legislature 
had no need to "establish" such a policy in 1974. It is clear 
that the Legislature did not regard Section 33-1-1 as being in 
any sense prohibitive or comprehensive in its application to the 
public funds, the disposition of which the Legislature undertook 
to regulate and circumscribe in the 1974 Act. If Section 33-1-1 
had been regarded as an enabling or prohibitive statute, its repeal 
would have been necessary, as was the repeal of a number of other 
regulatory sections. Section 33-1-1 has not been repealed. See 
Repealing Clause, State Money Management Act of 1974, LAWS 1974, 
ch. 27, §39. The legal list contained in Section 33-1-1 has 
been declared no longer applicable to investments of public 
funds, U.C.A. §51-7-21 (1974 Interim Supplement), but it has 
been replaced by more comprehensive legal lists, U.C.A. §§ 51-
7-11 and 12 (1974 Interim Supplement), by a "prudent man11 
rule applicable to investments of certian non-appropriated funds 
of member institutions of the state system of higher education, 
U.C.A. §51-7-14 (1974 Interim Supplement), and by a five part 
list of criteria to be used by all public treasurers in making 
deposits and investments of all public funds. U.C.A. §51-7-17 
(1974 Interim Supplement). Interestingly, funds acquired by gift, 
devise, or bequest or private grant may still be invested in 
common stock, although the Legislature has specified criteria 
to be used in determining the kinds of private corporations in 
which the university may invest. U.C.A. §§51-7-12 and 13 (1974 
Interim Supplement). All these additions to Utah statutory law 
make clear the fact that Section 33-1-1 was enacted as a legal 
list to declare presumptively legal investments for persons en-
trusted with investment responsibilities. 
First Equity is in agreement with the point made by USU 
before the Court below, that the university is "subject to the 
control of the Legislature", (R. 367), and First Equity does not 
contend that Article X, Section 4 of the Utah Constitution places 
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the university outside that control. First Equity argues, however, 
that at the time of the transactions in question, legislative 
control expressly allowed the purchase of common stock with funds 
in the universityfs custody. Public officers "purchased such sec-
urities at the risk of having to indemnify the public, but they 
were authorized to so invest the funds in their custody. Appel-
lant urges, furthermore, that the concern referred to above has 
its proper forum in the Legislature, where it appears to have 
been heard, and that it does not at this time constitute an appro-
priate argument before this Court. 
The issue before this Court is whether the above delineated 
statutory scheme permitted USU, at the time of the transactions 
involved in this litigation, to purchase common stock, with either 
public or non-appropriated funds. A determination that either 
alternative is possible under the statutes involved will require 
that the Order below granting USUfs Cross-Motion for Summary 
Judgment be reversed. 
POINT II 
THE COURT ERRED IN GRANTING USUfS CROSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT BECAUSE THE COURT DETERMINED THAT USU HAD POWER TO 
INVEST FUNDS RECEIVED FROM INDIVIDUAL GRANTS OR DEVELOPMENT 
CONTRACTS. 
A. Reasons for Appeal. 
The Memorandum Decision of the Court below states equivocally 
that Section 33-1-1 bars USUfs investment of funds in its custody 
in common stock, "with the possible exception of funds received 
by the institution from individual grants or development 
contracts11. (R. 258). Thus, in denying First Equityfs motion, 
the Lower Court stated that there was 
a triable issue of fact whether USU, at 
the time Catron ordered the stock in ques- ~ 
tion or the time payment for said stock 
fell due, had funds which it had received 
from individual grants or development con-
tracts sufficient to pay for part or all 
of said stock . . . . 
(R. 435B). 
The Court below could have determined that a triable issue of 
fact existed only if it had first determined that certain non-
appropriated funds could lawfully be invested in common stock. 
Therefore, Appellant submits that the Lower Court erred in grant-
ing USU's Cross-Motion on the basis that no funds in the custody 
of the university could be invested in common stock. 
B. Authority to Invest Non-Appropriated Funds. 
In 1929 and again in 1969, the Utah Legislature explicitly 
stated that USU could invest funds received as contributions, 
grants, gifts, devises, or bequests. See 5B U.C.A. §§ 53-32-4 
and 53-48-20(3) (quoted above in relevant part)e On December 
15, 1972, the office of the Attorney General issued an opinion 
letter to the State Auditor informing him that USU had authority 
"to invest funds derived from grants, gifts, devises or bequests 
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in such securities or other property as it deems fit or as the 
donor may specify.11 [Emphasis added]. (R. 157, at 5)* At the 
time of the transactions involved in this litigation, USU 
allegedly was operating or was supposed to be operating on the 
basis of that opinion. (R. 215-17). 
C. Contradictory Orders Below. 
In granting USUfs Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, the 
Court below stated that First Equity's claim was ffbarred by the 
provisions of the Utah Code prohibiting the investment by state 
employees of funds in their custody in securities other than thos 
enumerated in Utah Code §33-1-1." (R. 435D). The obvious meaning 
of this Order is that no funds in the custody of USU may be in-
vested in common stock. The Lower Court also concluded that 
certain non-appropriated funds could be invested in common stock, 
based upon Sections 53-48-10(5) and 53-48-20(3) of the Utah 
Code. (R. 258). Appellant agrees entirely with that portion of 
the Lower Court's decision which concludes that USU had the 
power to invest non-appropriated funds; however, appellant dis-
agrees with the way the Lower Court ignored that part of its own 
conclusion in granting USUfs Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment. 
Therefore, First Equity petitions this Court to affirm the con-
clusion of the Lower Court that non-appropriated funds in the 
custody of USU could have been invested in common stock and to 
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reverse the Order granting USUfs Cross-Motion for Summary 
Judgment. 
POINT III 
THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING FIRST EQUITY'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT BECAUSE NO TRIABLE ISSUE OF FACT WAS RAISED 
BY THE CONCLUSION THAT USU COULD INVEST FUNDS RECEIVED FROM 
INDIVIDUAL GRANTS OR DEVELOPMENT CONTRACTS. 
A. Reason for Appeal. 
The Lower Court denied First Equity's Motion for Summary 
Judgment because it concluded that an issue of fact was raised 
as to whether sufficient non-appropriated funds were available 
for USU to purchase the common stock. (R. 435B). First Equity 
contends that this conclusion is erroneous because whether 
such funds were available is not a relevant issue. 
Whether or not USU had sufficient authorized funds to pur-
chase the shares is irrelevant to the question of whether First 
Equity is entitled to compensation, unless the Court assumes 
that the agent of a governmental body is on constructive notice 
that his contract is ultra vires any time the governmental body 
does not have sufficient authorized funds to meet its contract 
obligations. Such a proposition is untenable. 
B. First Equity was the Agent of USU. 
* The transactions involved in this litigation were unsolicited 
orders placed by USU with First Equity and First Equity's duty was 
to purchase shares of stock, as a broker, for the account of USU 
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and to tender delivery of the certificates to USU. (R. 99-149, 
160-62, 312-13), A broker has been defined as n[a]n agent em-
ployed to make bargains and contracts for compensation.11 [Empha-
sis added]. BLACK1S LAW DICTIONARY 241 (4th ed. 1951). Stock 
brokers have been defined as lf[b]rokers employed to buy and sell 
for their principals stocks, bonds, government securities, etc.11 
[Emphasis added]. JEd., at 242. Article I, Section 3(a) of the 
By-Laws of the National Association of Securities Dealers states, 
in pertinent part, that a broker is "any individual, corporation 
.
 # # or other legal entity engaged in the business of effecting 
transactions in securities for the account of others . . . .fI 
[Emphasis added]. See N.A.S.D. By-Laws, Art. I, §3(a) CCH N.A.S.D. 
MANUAL K1103. According to the Utah Uniform Commercial Code, 7B 
U.C.A. §70A-8-303, a broker is "a person engaged for all or part of 
his time in the business of buying and selling securities, who in 
the transaction concerned acts for, or buys a security from or 
sells a security to a customer." [Emphasis added]. Thus, in per-
forming its contractual duties to purchase stock, First Equity was 
clearly the agent of USU. • ., 
C. Performance by First Equity,, *---. .v 
USU, through its Assistant Vice President of Finance, entered 
into the five oral contracts involved in this litigation, under 
which First Equity was to purchase certain shares of common stock 
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and deliver them to USU. All five purchases were consummated and 
notice thereof was sent to USU. (R. 99-149, 160-62). First Equity 
did everything necessary to cause delivery to be made as USU 
had directed. On March 13, 1973, delivery of certificates repre-
senting 3,000 shares of Advanced Memory Systems was tendered to USU, 
but payment was refused. (R# 305, 307, 313). At approximately the 
same time, delivery was tendered to USU of sufficient shares to 
completely satisfy the other four outstanding orders. (R. 313, 342). 
On March 19, 1973, USU informed First Equity that the university 
would not accept delivery with respect to all five orders because 
Catron was not authorized to purchase common stock. (R. 196, 251). 
This repudiation of the five contracts was transmitted to First 
Equity approximately two weeks after USU had purchased, received, 
accepted and paid for $445,050 worth of Fashion Fabric1s common 
stock through the services of First Equity.(R. 99-149, 160-62). 
Written confirmation of this decision by USU was given to First 
Equity's Salt Lake City attorney on March 22, 1973* by hand deliv-
ered letter from Assistant Attorney General Madsen. (R. 330-31). 
P. First Equity1s Right to Compensation. :; 
An agent is entitled to his compensation when he completes 
his undertaking, even though his principal received no benefit 
therefrom. Curtis v. Mortensen, 1 Utah 2d 354, 267 Po2d 237 (1954); 
, 3 Am Jur 2d, Agency §§ 247 et seq.; 12 Am Jur 2d, Brokers §§183, 
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199 et seqp First Equity's undertaking was based upon an oral 
contract to purchase certain shares and to tender delivery to USU. 
First Equity had purchased the shares in question and had tendered 
delivery or had done all that was required of it to accomplish 
delivery of the certificates to USU when USU repudiated the con-
tracts, All of the actions which were to be undertaken by the i 
personnel of First Equity had been completed0 Therefore, First 
Equity is entitled to compensation, in the form of commissions, 
from USU, whether or not USU actually purchased the stock. 
Under certain circumstances, an agent is also entitled to k 
indemnity from his principal for the damages the agent suffers 
as a result of the performance of unlawful acts by the agent. In 
Horrabin v. Pes Moines, 198 Iowa 549, 199 N.W. 988 (1924), the 
City of Des Moines employed Horrabin as its agent to build a x 
bridge and agreed to furnish the necessary rights-of-way, Horrabin" 
built the bridge where the City had directed, but the City failed 
to obtain a necessary right-of-way. The property owner brought an 
action of trespass against the City and Horrabin and recovered 
against Horrabin. Horrabin then sought to have the City indemnify 
him for losses suffered as a result of the trespass he had com-
mitted as the agent of the City. The court held that since the 
actions of Horrabin were not manifestly illegal, and were done in 
the execution of his agency, the City should be required to indemni-
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fy him for losses suffered by reason of the trespass action. 
The Utah Supreme Court adopted the same principle in Hoggan 
y0 Gaboon, 26 Utah 444, 73 P. 512 (1903) in which the Court 
quoted Moore v. Appleton, 26 Ala. 633, 638-39 (1855), to the 
effect that indemnity will be allowed between an agent and his 
principal: 
where the act of the agent was not manifestly 
illegal in itself, and was done bona fide in 
the execution of his agency, and without know-
ledge (either actual or implied by law) that 
it was illegal • . . . 
26 Utah at 450, 73 P. at 514. 
The actions of First Equity were clearly "done bona fide in 
the execution11 of the oral brokerage contract. The purchase of 
common stock by First Equity on behalf of USU flwas not manifestly 
illegal in itself11 because USU had been purchasing common stock 
for some time and even the Attorney Generalfs office had concluded 
that investment in common stock was not necessarily illegal. (R. 
157, at 5). Actual knowledge that USU had revoked Catronfs power 
to authorize Appellant to purchase common stock, if such had in 
fact occurred, was not transmitted to First Equity until after 
First Equity had performed its contractual duties. Constructive 
knowledge that Catron had no authority cannot be implied by law to 
First Equity because, according to the opinion letter issued by 
the office of the Attorney General, Catron did have limited authori 
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ty to invest in common stock. Furthermore, USU had just completed 
a purchase of over $400,000 worth of common stock through First 
Equity. Therefore, First Equity is entitled to be indemnified by 
USU for losses it suffered in the resale of the shares of Advanced 
Memory Systems. 
E. Constructive Knowledge of Insufficient Funds. 
The factual issue of whether sufficient non-appropriated 
funds were available is not relevant to any of the foregoing pro-
positions, unless First Equity can be held to have had constructive 
notice that the purchase contracts were ultra vires because no 
authorized funds were available. The Court below appears to have 
held just that. 
^ _ Practically, the burden imposed by such a ruling upon all 
transactions between governmental entities and their private agents 
would be insurmountable. The agent would have to obtain some form 
of a guarantee that the funds would be available when he had per-
formed his part of the contract, such as having the money placed 
in an escrow account. Otherwise, the jjovernmental entity could turn 
its back on the contract, as it has done in this case, and claim 
"Ultra vires!11 by reason of insufficient funds. The Utah Supreme 
Court has clearly not adopted any ruling which would uphold such a 
position. 
In Baker Lumber Co. v. A.A. Clark Co., 53 Utah 336, 178 P. 764 
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(1919), a school district had contracted with an agent to build 
a high school. Sufficient funds to pay for the high school were 
not available when the school was built; so, the school district 
issued interest-bearing warrants payable on demand and at a speci-
fied time. The issuance of such warrants was not authorized by 
statute and the interest payments were later disputed. The Court* 
stated: 
There is no express provision in the 
statutes of this state authorizing school 
^ boards or other public corporations to 
issue interest-bearing warrants» There is 
a provision relating to interest on school 
bonds issued after authority obtained from 
the qualified electors of the several school 
districts, and the rate of interest for such 
indebtedness is that the bonds so issued 
shall bear interest not exceeding five per 
cent per annum, payable annually or semi-
r ,r annually. Manifestly that provision of the 
statute does not relate to and does not 
govern where the facts are as in this case. 
It is further contended that the great 
weight of authority, in the absence of ex-
press statutory provisions, is that warrants 
issued by public corporations do not bear 
interest. 
In this action, as indicated, the debt 
was due at the time the building was accep-
ted. The school board was authorized to 
contract to pay the debt at that date. We 
are unable to understand why a public cor-
poration should not be required to meet its 
obligations the same as any other body auth-
orized to contract debts, and upon a failure 
to make payments at the time agreed why it 
should not be required to pav interest for 
* "*•*•*••
 a
 any forbearance as an individual. [Emphasis 
added]. 
53 Utah at 350; 178 P. at 770. 
Appellant urges this Court to find that the Lower Court erred 
in holding that the amount of non-appropriated funds available to 
USU for the purchase of common stock was a relevant issue of fact. 
POINT IV 
;--'•--' THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING FIRST EQUITY'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY " 
JUDGMENT BECAUSE A TECHNICAL VIOLATION OF THE 35-DAY MARGIN RE-
QUIREMENT OF REGULATION T DOES NOT CONSTITUTE A COMPLETE DEFENSE 
TO FIRST EQUITY'S CLAIM FOR DAMAGES. 
A. Reason for Appeal. - ^ 
First Equity's failure to deliver the order of Advanced 
Memory Systems shares to USU within thirty-five days from 
the date Catron placed the order constituted a technical viola-
tion of Regulation T, 12 C.F.R. Part 220, promulgated by the Federal 
Reserve Board. According to the Lower Court, this violation con-
stitutes a complete defense to First Equity's damage action based 
upon those orders. (R. 435B). The Lower Court reached this con-
clusion by finding that Avery v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce., Fenner & 
Smith, 328 F. Supp. 677 (D.D.C. 1971), represented "a proper ruling" 
on the question. (R. 259). Appellant submits that the conclusion 
of the Court below is in error because: (1) Avery was not good law 
at the time it was decided; (2) prior to the decision below, Congress 
had effectively overruled Avery; and (3) the appellate courts which 
have considered the question of an affirmative defense based upon 
Regulation T have unanimously ruled that a technical violation of 
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Regulation T does not constitute a complete defense to a broker's 
action for damages# 
Bo Statutory Background0 
Section 7 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the "Ex-
change Act11), 15 U.S.C. §78g, provides in part: * 
(a) For the purpose of preventing 
f
 the excessive use of credit for the pur-
chase or carrying of securities, the 
^ Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System shall, prior to the effective date 
- t : of this section and from time to time 
thereafter, prescribe rules and regulations 
with respect to the amount of credit that 
may be initially extended and subsequently 
maintained on any security (other than an 
exempted security). 
Such rules and regulations may make appro-
priate provision with respect to the carry- , 
, ing of . . . special or different margin ; 
requirements for delayed deliveries . . . . 
The primary legislative purpose for this section of the Exchange 
Act "is to give a Government credit agency an effective method of 
reducing the aggregate amount of the nation's credit resources 
which can be diverted . . . into the stock market11. H.R. REP. NO. 
1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1934). Congress also recognized 
that a by-product of the main purpose would be protection of 
"the small speculator by making it impossible for him to spread -
himself too thinly0fl [Emphasis added]* Jxl. '"•• 
Section 7 of the Exchange Act also provided: 
-^7-
(c) It shall be unlawful for any member 
of a national securities exchange or any *iol h ? 
broker or dealer, directly or indirectly, 
,,x?: to extend or maintain credit . 0 . ,^ ^ 
(1) on any security . . . in contravention 
of the rules and regulations which the Board 
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System ••?•, ID 
shall prescribe . . . . 
Violations of the rules and regulations promulgated by the Federal 
Reserve Board subject a broker to disciplinary action by the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission. See 15 U.S.C. §78o-3(e)(2); Strath-
more SeCo, Inc. [1964-66 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 
1(77,426 (S.E.C. 1966). i; J 
Pursuant to its statutory authority, the Federal Reserve 
Board issued Regulation T, which states in relevant part: 
^ General Rule (a)(1) Pursuant to this 
section, a creditor may establish for any 
customer one or more special accounts. 
(c)(1) In a special cash account, a cre-
ditor may effect for or with any customer 
bona fide cash transactions in securities i « 
in which the creditor may: 
(i) Purchase any security for, or sell 
any security to any customer, provided I 
. . . the purchase or sale is in reliance 
upon an agreement accepted by the creditor ; ! 
in good faith that the customer will promp-
tly make full cash payment for the security ^i 
and that the customer does not contemplate 
selling the security prior to making such ;i 
payment. 
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(2) In case a customer purchases a 
security
 0 • . in the special cash account 
and does not make full cash payment for the 
security within 7 days after the date on 
which the security is so purchased, the cre«-
ditor shall, except as provided in subpara-
graphs (3)-(7) of this paragraph, promptly 
cancel or otherwise liquidate the transaction 
or the unsettled portion thereof. 
• • • 
(5) If the creditor, acting in good faith 
in accordance with subparagraph (1) of this 
paragraph, purchases a security for a customer, 
or sells a security to a customer, with the under-
standing that he is to deliver the security promp-
tly to the customer, and the full cash payment to 
be made against such delivery, the creditor may 
at his option treat the transaction as one to 
which the period applicable under subparagraph 
(2) of this paragraph is not the 7 days therein 
specified but 35 days after the date of such pur-
chase or sale. 
12 C.F.R. §220.4(a),(c). 
Thus, a broker acting in good faith may purchase a security 
into a special cash account for a customer who has agreed to promptly 
make full cash payment for the security prior to selling the securi-
ty • Under most circumstances, ^if the customer does not pay within 
seven days of the purchase date, the broker must liquidate the 
account. However, to protect the customer from the economic dis-
advantage of purchasing a large block pf shares in a thin market, 
Regulation T provides that delivery of the block of shares and pay-
ment therefor can be extended over a thirty-five day period. If 
delivery and payment are not accomplished within the thirty-five 
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days, the account is to be liquidated. See generally, Effros, 
A Note on Regulation T, 82 BANKING L.J. 471 (1965). 
Effective November 1, 1971, Section 7 of the Exchange Act 
was amended, resulting in a reapportionment of the burden of 
compliance with the margin rules. Subsection (f) of Section 7 
now reads in pertinent part: ^
 t 
(1) It is unlawful for any United States per-
son . . . to obtain, receive, or enjoy the bene-
ficial use of a loan or other extension of 
credit from any lender . . . for the purpose of 
(A) purchasing or carrying Unites States secur-
ities . . . if
 0 . . the loan or other credit 
transaction is prohibited. 
Also effective November 1, 1971, the Federal Reserve Board issued 
Regulation X, 12 C.F.R. Part 224, which sets forth the rules 
governing investors who obtain credit in securities transactions. 
The relevant parts of Section 224.2(a) of Regulation X state: 
A borrower shall not obtain any purpose 
credit [i.e., credit for the purpose of pur-
chasing or carrying securities] . . . unless 
he does so in compliance with the following 
conditions: 
(2) Credit obtained from a broker/dealer 
shall conform to the provisions of Part 220 
(Regulation T ) , which is hereby incorporated in 
this part (Regulation X ) . When the term "broker/ 
dealerflis used in this part (Regulation X ) , it 
means a person who is a broker or dealer, in-
cluding every member of a national securities 
exchange, and includes a foreign branch or sub-
sidiary of a broker/dealer. 
-/. n. 
Lastly, Section 29 of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. §78cc, states 
in pertinent part: 
(b) Every contract made in violation of 
' any provision of this title or of any rule or 
regulation thereunder, and every contract (in-
cluding any contract for listing a security on 
an exchange) heretofore or hereafter made the 
*•"""•*•' performance of which involves the violation of, 
- ^
 ;
 or the continuance of any relationship or prac- ^ ; 
tice in violation of, any provision of this 
title or any rule or regulation thereunder, shall 
be void (1) as regards the rights of any person 
who, in violation of any such provision, rule, 
-* •*-• or regulation, shall have made or engaged in 
the performance of any such contract, and (2) 
as regards the rights of any person who, not c 
being a party to such contract, shall have ac-
j
 quired any right thereunder with actual know-
ledge of the facts by reason of which the making 
or performance of such contract was in violation 
of any such provision, rule, or regulation . . . . 
Thus, on the face of the statute, a contract "made in violation 
of" or "the performance of which constitutes the violation of" 
Regulation T or Regulation X appears to be completely void. The 
courts, however, have refused to interpret Section 29(b) so broadly. 
C. Court Interpretations of Section 29(b). 
Courts have dealt with Section 29(b) in two pertinent contexts: 
:-^-v^ir)-where^a borrower brings a damage action to recover losses sustain-
ed by reason of the lender's violation of federal margin require-
ments; and (2) where a lender sues the borrower for losses and the 
borrower asserts a violation of federal margin requirements as a 
complete defense. 
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Prior to the enactment of Section 7(f) and the issuance of 
Regulation X thereunder, the majority of courts deciding the scope 
of Section 29(b), when the plaintiff borrower sought rescission 
of the contract, held that contracts subject to that section were 
not void but voidable. See Gordon v. duPont, Glore, Forgan, Inc. 
487 F. 2d 1250 (5th Cir. 1973); Greater Iowa Corp. v. McLendon, 
378 F.2d 783 (8th Cir. 1967); Royal Air Properties, Inc. v. Smith, 
312 F.2d 210 (9th Cir. 1962); Goldman v. Bank of the Commonwealth, 
332 F. Supp. 699 (E.D. Mich. 1971), aff'd, 467 F.2d 439 (6th Cir. 
1972); Aubin v. H. Hentz & Co., 303 F. Supp. 1119 (S.D. Fla. 1969); 
Serzysko v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 290 F. Supp. 74 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), 
aff'd per curiam, 409 F.2d 1360 (2d Cir. 1969); Moscarelli v. Stamm, 
288 F. Supp. 453 (E.D.N.Y. 1968); J. Cliff Rahel & Co. v. Roper, 
186 Neb. 34, 180 N.W. 2d 682 (1970). This interpretation received 
Supreme Court approval in a case involving the violation of proxy 
rules, Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970). The 
Court concluded that a contract should be set aside under Section 
29(b) "only if a court of equity concludes, from all the circum-
stances, that it would be equitable to do so." 396 U.S. at 388. 
Shortly after the Mills decision, the Second Circuit Court of 
Appeals appeared to hold that a technical violation of Regulation 
T resulted in the contract being void rather than voidable under 
Section 29(b) despite the equities of the case. Pearlstein_Vj. 
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Scudder & German, 429 F.2d 1136 (2d Cir. 1970). However, the court 
also noted that the investor did not contest his liability for the 
original contract price nor his liability for losses incurred prior 
to the time-limit violation. 429 F.2d at 1141 n.9. Thus, the de-
cision only applied to the question of contract damages suffered 
after the Regulation T violation. In spite of this major limitation 
on the Pearlstein conclusion, the court in Avery v. Merrill, Lynch, 
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 328 F. Supp. 677 (D.D.C. 1971), cited Pearl-
stein as authority for the proposition that a Regulation T violation 
by a broker automatically voids a sales contract under Section 
29(b), thereby making the broker liable for all damages suffered 
by an investor. Since Avery was relied upon by the Court below, 
it will be discussed in detail. 
In Avery, a broker sold some stock short for a sophisticated 
investor, but the investor did not have sufficient funds in her * 
account to meet the margin requirements of Regulation T. During 
the following two weeks, the broker diligently attempted to obtain 
the additional monies from the investor and, failing to do so, the 
broker liquidated the investorfs short position at a loss to her of 
over $8,000. She then sued the broker to have the entire transac-
tion declared null and void and rescinded under Section 29(b) 
because the broker violated the seven-day margin limit set by 
Regulation :T. The court found, as had a majority in Pearlstein, 
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that Congress had placed the onus of compliance with the margin 
requirements on brokers, and not on their customers. 328 F. Supp. 
at 680, citing Pearlstein, 429 F.2d at 1141. Since Congress had 
placed the ultimate responsibility with brokers, the court re-
fused to shift that burden to the customer and the transaction 
was held to be null and void under Section 29(b). 328 F. Supp. at 
680-81. Nevertheless, the court expressed dissatisfaction with 
the result: 
The Court deplores this type of alleged 
investor behavior and were not the man- x 
date of Congress so unequivocal and the 
public policy considerations to strong, ^ 
the Court might reach a substantially 
different decision than the one it does. 
328 F. Supp. at 681. 
Although Pearlstein can be interpreted as consistent with 
previous cases in light of the equitable apportionment of damages x 
which it accomplished, the result in Avery imposed all the damages -
on the broker and did not take into account any defenses based 
upon comparative fault or participatory behavior on the part of 
^ - the investor. Thus, Avery stands for a theory of strict liability 
for violations of Regulation T. 
Section 7(f) and Regulation X became effective shortly after 
the decision in Avery, Since that case turned entirely on the fact 
that Congress had placed the onus of compliance solely on brokers, 
it seems clear that the decision has been effectively overruled. 
Investors are now equally responsible for compliance. - - -
, .r> In Bell v. J.D. Winer & Co., Incr>, F. Supp. .. _ [Current 
Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. K95,002 (S.t).N.Y. Mar. 5f 1975), , 
the investors brought action against the broker for a minor margin 
infraction that occurred long before the securities declined in 
value. The court noted that Section 7(f) and Regulation X under-
mine the approach to Section 29(b) taken by Pearlstein» and held 
that a de minimis violation of Regulation T does not always support 
a borrower's implied right of action. Thus, the court not only 
: . xefused to utilize a strict liability theory in connection with 
, Section 29(b), but granted summary judgment in favor of the de-
fendants because plaintiffs had alleged no claim upon which relief 
could be granted. It is clear that the strict liability theory 
of Avery is not good law. e ,.> „,..  -
_.,. ___.
 rlo dater .counsel far First Equity have found only three eases 
, of record wherein courts have been required to interpret Section 
29(b) in the context of the customer asserting, a brokerfs Regula-
: , tion T violation as a defense. All three cases were decided prior 
to the effective date of Section 7(f) and Regulation X. -
In Staley v. Salvesen, 35 Pa.D. & C. 2d 318 (C.C. Phila. 1963), 
a broker brought an action in assumpsit against his customer because 
the broker had suffered a loss when the customer's special cash- — 
-45-
account was liquidated,. The customer claimed that the brokerfs 
violation of Regulation T was a complete defense and the trial 
-„ courtruled that the brokerfs violation automatically voided the — 
contract under Section 29(b). The case was not appealed. 
Billings Associates, Inc. v. Bashaw« 27 App. Div. 2d 124, 
276 N.Y.S. 2d 446 (4th Depft 1967), involved a purchase of stock 
by a broker pursuant to the investorfs oral stock purchase order. 
The customer failed to pay within the seven-day period prescribed 
by Regulation T and the broker waited nearly one month before ^ 
liquidating the account. The brokerfs suit to recover the liqui- L: 
,:--:—:> dation deficiency was^  dismissed by the trial court, but the appellate ^ 
court reversed, holding that Section 29(b) only voids those contracts 
which by their terms actually violate the Exchange Act and Regulation 
T* The court stated that the broker was entitled to damages based 
upon the investorfs breach, but it refused to allow the broker to ? 
benefit by its violation of Regulation T. Therefore, damages were 
limited to the difference between the purchase price of the shares 
and the highest market price between the date the account should 
have been liquidated and the date of sale by the broker. (Signifi-
cantly, JPea£l£tein cites Billings Associates with approval when it 
discusses the question of the equitable apportionment of damages. 
See 429 F.2d at 1141 n.9.) 
The second appellate decision which interpreted Section 29(b) 
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in the"context of a Regulation T defense was Gregory-Massari, Inc. 
v. Purkitt, 1 Cal.App. 3d 968, 82 Cal. Rptr. 210 (1969). The facts 
were the same as in the other two cases and the broker sued to re-
cover the liquidation deficiency. The broker relied on Billings 
Associates and the investor relied on Staley; the court agreed with 
the interpretation given to Section 29(b) in Billings Associates 
and pointed out that the trial judge in Staley erroneously ruled 
on the basAs of her paraphrase of Section 29(b). The measure of --
damages adopted by the court was the same as that adopted in Billings 
Associates and Pearlstein. 
Thus, it appears clear that the decision of the Lower Court, 
to the effect that a Regulation T violation constitutes a complete 
defense to an action for damages, is erroneous. The oral contracts 
entered into between First Equity and USU did not by their terms 
actually violate Regulation T and, therefore, Appellant petitions 
— the Court to find that the Lower Court erred in denying Appellant's " 
Motion for Summary Judgment on this ground. 
D. Limitation on Damages. 7 
PearIstein, Gregory-Mas sari, and Billings Associates apportioned 
losses between the broker and the investor. Basically, any losses 
incurred prior to the violation of Regulation T were to be borne by 
the investor and any losses suffered as a result of the Regulation 
T violation were to be borne by the broker. This ruling was brought 
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to the attention of the Lower Court and First Equity stipulated 
to reduce the damages sought on its Motion for Summary Judgment 
accordingly. (R. 424-25). Thus, First Equityfs claim for damages 
as a result of losses on the resale of the Advanced Memory Systems 
stock has been reduced from $37,045.27 to $15,625.00 and First 
Equity will suffer a non-recoverable loss of $21,420.27 as a result 
of its violation of Regulation T. USU does not dispute the figures 
used by Appellant to arrive at the aforementioned amounts. (R. 443). 
CONCLUSION 
The Summary Judgment of the Lower Court cannot be justified 
unless this Court were to hold: 
1. That the explicit Legislative grants of power to USU to 
purchase, hold and sell all forms of personal property, 
to convert private donations into other forms of property, 
and to invest such property were wholly insufficient to 
give USU the power to invest in common stock, or 
2. That even though USU may have been granted power to invest 
in common stock, the enactment of Section 33-1-1 of the 
Utah Code, in 1939, thereafter prohibited USU and any 
other private corporation or person from investing law-
fully in common stock, or 
3. That notwithstanding the fact that USU was authorized to 
invest certain non-appropriated funds in its custody in 
common stock, the Lower Court could ignore this in grant-
ing Summary Judgment in favor of USU. 
The denial of First Equityfs Motion for Summary Judgment cannot 
be justified unless this Court were to hold: 
1. That the agent of a governmental entity is on constructive 
notice that his contract is ultra vires any time that the 
entity does not have sufficient authorized funds to meet 
its contract obligations, or 
2. That a sophisticated institutional investor may abso-
lutely avoid a contract with its broker whenever that 
broker inadvertantly violates the time-limit require-
ments of Regulation T, notwithstanding the fact that 
the investor utilized the particular broker so as to 
obtain cash-flow benefits resulting from the delays 
inherent in dealing with a broker over 2,000 miles 
away. 
Appellant contends that the bases of the Lower Court's rulings 
are not sound and that the Orders should be reversed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
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